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Background 
Drugs policy is made in a politically charged atmosphere. This is often not seen to be 
conducive to the ideals of evidence-based policymaking. In the UK over recent years the 
efficacy of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) has been one of the most widely discussed 
and debated areas of UK drug policy. Since inception, the MDA 1971 has remained relatively 
stable with very few drugs moving up or down the scale and until recently, and with very 
few exceptions, there has been little public debate on the nature of the system. This 
changed in the run up to the cannabis reclassification in 2004 from class B to class C, 
through the reverse of this decision in 2009 and the fallout between the Government of the 
time and leading members of the Advisory Council of the Misuse of Drugs. 
 
Methods 
Based on wide-ranging survey of the literature and secondary analysis of various official 
publications and academic commentaries, this paper considers what the cannabis episode 
can tell us about the current state of UK drug policy governance. 
 
Results 
Previous research on drug policy governance has suggested that policy goals should be 
clearly articulated so as to avoid confusion over what constitutes evidence, decision-makers 
should be ‘evidence-imbued’ and there should be widespread consultation with, and 
transparency of, stakeholder engagement. The interpretation here is that recent changes to 
cannabis legislation reveal that these aspects of good governance were called into question 
although there were fleeting moments of good practice. 
 
Conclusion 
The use of evidence in drug policy formulation continues to be bedevilled by political 
stalemate and reluctance to countenance radical reform. Where evidence does play a role it 
tends to be at the margins. There are, however, potential lessons to be learned from other 
policy areas but this requires a more pragmatic attitude on behalf of decision-makers. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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“Science can, indeed, I would argue must, be the prime mediator of policy if we are to 
minimize the harms of drugs, both medical and social, but science cannot deliver policy 
because that is the realm of politics” (Nutt, 2010 p.1154) 
 
In the UK (and elsewhere) drug policy is made in a politically charged atmosphere. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in debates over the legal classification of substances. In the UK 
the legal classification of drugs is covered by the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act (MDA). Since inception, the MDA has remained relatively stable with very few drugs 
moving up or down the scale. This changed in the run up to the cannabis reclassification 
from class B to class C in 2004 through the reverse of this decision in 2009 and with the 
subsequent fallout between the Government of the time and leading members of the 
Advisory Council of the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), against whose advice the latter decision 
was taken. 
 
The efficacy of the 1971 MDA has come to be one of the most widely discussed and debated 
areas of UK drug policy. Here a clash between science and politics is highly visible and  
debates are highly politicised. The media reporting of these debates has tended not to focus 
on the complex scientific deliberation and the evidence-base underpinning classification 
proposals, but on the political sensibilities of politicians who are labelled as liberal or 
illiberal on drug policy depending on attitudes towards classification and thus the extent 
that they are willing to be guided by evidence. Here the UK is not alone and nor is this a new 
development. Tieberghien and Decorte (2013) note similar themes in their discussion of 
recent changes in Belgian drugs policy. MacGregor (2013:227), meanwhile, demonstrates 
that the ‘tension between evidence and values’ has been a ‘consistent theme’ in drug policy 
formulation for some time.  
 
In recent years, many governments and agencies have committed themselves to the process 
of designing, developing, implementing and evaluating policies with a strong research base. 
In essence, they have signed up to a programme of evidence-based policy making (EBPM). 
Although the research and policy connection has a long history, in the UK EBPM was closely 
with the election of the New Labour government in 1997. From the outset, the ideal of 
EBPM outlined by the New Labour government was beset with problems (see Head, 2010). 
Primary amongst these was the suggestion that policy-makers and politicians are influenced 
by factors other than the findings of research .Since the passing of the 1971 MDA, in public 
debate and discourse, drugs have taken on especial negative connotations being associated 
with incivility and vice. Consequently, drugs have been linked to the ‘other’ and have 
aroused passionate, value-driven debates over their perceived harms and dangers. As this is 
so, they are ‘unlikely to be dealt with simply as matter of technocratic, evidence-based, 
scientific discourse’ (MacGregor, 2013:226). 
 
Oakley (2012) provides some for evidence for this comparing and contrasting the fluctuating 
fortunes of 2 major reports published in the 1960s, both authored by Baroness Wootton. 
The first Wootton Report on Cannabis legislation (Advisory Committee on Drug 
Dependence, 1968) was disowned by the government that had sponsored it’, whereas the 
second report on alternatives to prison (Advisory Council on the Penal System, 1970), ‘led 
directly to legislation establishing community service as an alternative to imprisonment, a 
sentence that is still part of penal policy today’ (Oakley, 2012: 268). Unlike Wooton’s Prisons 
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report, Oakley suggests that the cannabis report dealt with a specific highly contentious 
issue that led to sensationalist reportage by the media of the day. In addition, the Cannabis 
report’s findings took the form of a nuanced message that cannabis should not be legalised, 
but that it should be made distinct in law from other prohibited substances. This message 
was inconsistent with the ideological stance of key decision-makers at the time, especially 
Home Secretary James Callaghan. Similar themes, as we shall see, can be witnessed over 4 
decades later. 
 
The issue of cannabis classification gained prominence because it was linked to an 
increasing preoccupation amongst academics, policy makers and the public over the way 
that evidence is used, misused or unused in policy making. Policy-making that draws on and 
uses a broad evidence-base is seen to be a key component of good governance as outlined 
in a recent report by the UKDPC (Hamilton, et al, 2012) however, the primacy status of 
evidence in policy is questioned by the way that it cannot or should not interfere with the 
principles of democratic decision-making (HM Government, 2011). In short, the reversal of 
the decision to classify cannabis as a Class C substance provides a critical case study in 
looking at the often fractious relationship between the role and use of evidence in decision-
making and the principles of parliamentary democracy and how best to bridge this gap. 
With this in mind, the first section offers a brief overview of the way drugs are classified 
under 1971 MDA. This is followed by a look at more recent events relating to proposed 
changes to the drug classification system primarily relating to cannabis. Next, discussion 
turns to the link between the disputes over drug classification and how these relate to some 
of the principles of good governance outlined in previous research by the United Kingdom 
Drug Policy Commission (Hamilton, et al, 2012). The penultimate section turns towards 
some potential solutions. Finally, some concluding remarks are made. 
 
The 1971 MDA Drug Classification System 
 
The origins of the 1971 MDA can be traced to discussions in the run up to the 1961 United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Single Convention aimed to standardise 
the control of narcotics across nations so that certain drugs could be used only for scientific, 
medical, and in some cases, industrial purposes. This was achieved by arranging drugs into 
schedules and applying appropriate controls based on their harm and toxicity. Any article in 
contravention of the convention was a punishable offence, with a custodial term for serious 
breaches (Fortson 2005). A defining feature of the MDA is its instigation of a strict 
classification system for scheduling drugs. Thus, in the UK drugs are placed in one of three 
categories, A, B or C determined by the extent of relative harm their misuse is perceived to 
inflict on the individual and society. Indeed, as Levitt, et al. (2006:15) note Section 1.2 of the 
MDA states that drugs are divided between classes based on: (a) whether the drug is being 
misused; (b) whether it is likely to be misused and (c) whether the misuse in either case is 
having or could have harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem. 
 
 
A further key component of the 1971 legislation was that it established Britain’s first 
statutory expert advisory body on illicit drugs, the ACMD. Amongst their many functions, 
the ACMD continuously review the UK drug situation, paying particular attention to the 
misuse (or the potential thereof) of drugs by the public to the extent that they might be 
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considered a social problem. This is mainly achieved through the production of detailed and 
rigorous evidence reviews. Their membership is made up from across the scientific, 
industrial and professional sectors, but most of their work concentrates on the 
pharmacological evidence-base for existing and emerging substances thus embedding 
science, research and expertise into the decision-making process. For most of its existence it 
was common practice for the government to accept and act upon the recommendations of 
the council, although in a very high-profile way this relationship has been tumultuous over 
recent years, highlighted in recent public debates about the classification of ecstasy, magic 
mushroomsi and, primarily, cannabis within the MDA. 
 
The Changing Status of Cannabis in the MDA 
 
In the run up to the cannabis classification in 2004, evidence from a number of high-profile 
reports into the operation of the MDA had concluded that the current system had created 
some anomalies and that cannabis, in particular, was classified too high in class B (Police 
Foundation, 2000; Home Affairs Committee, 2002). The Police Foundation Report (2000) 
had particular significance suggesting that the downgrading of cannabis should be 
undertaken alongside more discretionary use of police warnings for cannabis possession 
offences. This coincided with the so-called ‘Brixton experiment’ which effectively introduced 
informal disposal and a formal on-the-spot warning for those caught in possession of 
cannabis. Against this backdrop, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, told the Home 
Affairs Committee in October 2001 that he was ‘minded’ to downgrade cannabis and would 
seek advice from the ACMD on the possibility of reclassification. The ACMD (2002) reported 
back that cannabis should be reclassified. In July 2003, it was announced that on 
Parliamentary approval cannabis would be reclassified to a class C drug, coming into force in 
January 2004ii. 
 
In a broader discussion over the complexity of the evidence-base for the reclassification, 
Monaghan (2010) demonstrates how the reform of the UK cannabis laws was contingent on 
two main factors. The first was that reclassification would concentrate police resources on 
tackling the perceived high-levels of acquisitive crime associated with the problematic use 
of heroin and crack cocaine (May, et al, 2002). This was on the assumption that time would 
not be spent processing cannabis arrests unless there were aggravating factors such as 
consuming cannabis in the vicinity of legal minors, for instance, near a school. The second 
factor was that in terms of its toxicity or harmfulness, cannabis was not comparable with 
other class A or B drugs. Following the 2004 reclassification, academic and public attention 
was drawn to the (re)discovery of the link between the use of particularly high-strength 
strains of cannabis (skunk) and certain kinds of mental illness (Fergusson, et al., 2005; 
Arsenault, et al., 2004; Henquet, et al., 2004.). 
 
A general mood of support from across the print media accompanied Blunkett’s initial 
decision. However, Daly and Sampson (2012:271) demonstrate how in the aftermath of 
cannabis reclassification the tabloid press ‘filled hundreds of column inches with 
exaggerated scare stories about the drug’. The ensuing panic reached a peak around 2007, 
but as early as 2002 the Daily Mail was reporting that cannabis use not only increased a 
user’s chances of becoming mentally ill, but that it was also linked to violent behaviour.   
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In March 2005, in the midst of the panic surrounding cannabis and primarily in response to 
warnings over skunk, the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke announced that the 
reclassification of cannabis implemented the previous year would be reviewed. Shortly 
after, the ACMD (2005) published a second review, stating that class C was appropriate, a 
decision accepted by Clarke. However, drug classification returned again to the media 
headlines in 2008. The new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown announced that, in light of 
continuing interest in the link between cannabis use and mental health, the classification of 
cannabis would once again be referred back to the ACMD. The ACMD (2008) reported back 
that although there was a consistent, but ‘weak’ association between cannabis use and the 
development of psychotic illness, they remained resolute that cannabis was correctly 
classified as a class C substance. However, unlike in 2005, the Government ignored this 
advice and announced a reversal of the 2004 downgrading. Some informed observers argue 
this was done to demonstrate difference with the previous policies and to curry favour with 
certain parts of the media (see Daly and Sampson 2012; Dunn, 2013).  
 
Whatever the underlying reasons, this was the origin of the dispute between Professor Nutt 
the then Chair of the ACMD and the New Labour government. This was to later escalate 
when in March 2009 the advisory council considered the legal status of ecstasy 
recommending a downgrading of its classification from class A to B (ACMD, 2009). The 
government’s decision to seemingly ignore outright this advice led to a heated exchange 
between Nutt and the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith. Later in 2009 relations between 
members of the ACMD and the government further deteriorated. Alan Johnson, who by this 
time had replaced Smith as Home Secretary, accused Nutt of overstepping his remit and of 
‘campaigning against’ government policy in a lecture delivered in July 2009 where Nutt 
claimed that based on the existing science both cannabis and ecstasy are less harmful than 
legal drugs such as alcohol and should, therefore, be downgraded. Nutt was subsequently 
dismissed from the ACMD leading to the resignation of five other members. 
 
The Politicisation of Drugs Policy and the Implications for Good Governance 
 
Debates over the nature of drugs policy are characterised by a non-trivial degree of 
politicisation and arouse emotions and thus sit alongside those of sentencing, police reform 
and other issues concerning the criminal-justice process. According to Loader and Sparks 
(2011), these debates have ‘heated up’ over recent years under the conditions of ‘totemic 
toughness’ (Stevens, 2011). The ‘emotional context of drug policy’ was also noted in the 
Royal Society of Arts (RSA) (2007) report into UK Drug policy: 
 
…the demonization of drugs seems to us to have had a seriously detrimental 
effect on the quality of the policy discussion around illegal drugs. Cool 
deliberation and informed dialogue become difficult or even impossible, and 
public debate becomes overheated and polarised. Politicians often seem 
afraid to raise the subject in general terms lest they be quizzed in a hostile 
way about their own experiences (RSA, 2007:37). 
 
Heavily politicised issues often conform to what Rittel and Webber, (1974) term ‘wicked 
issues’. These are policy areas that defy neat solutions as there is little agreement on the 
nature of the problem in the first instance. In debates over the evidence-base for 
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classification decisions, it is unclear whether the matter in hand is one of public health, law 
and order or morality, or indeed, all three. This can have serious implications for developing 
an evidence-base for policy (Monaghan, 2011) and in turn this impacts on effective 
governance in drug policy. To paraphrase, findings from the UKDPC research into the latter 
(Hamilton et al, 2012) revealed a number of issues that could ensure effective governance. 
These included: a) the key overarching goals of policy needed to be aspirational and realistic 
with cross-party support where possible, but clearly articulated so as to avoid confusion 
over what constitutes evidence in policy and how this is reconciled; b) in terms of policy 
delivery, evidence-imbued leadership is imperative in facilitating a central role for evidence 
use throughout the various stages of the policy process. Much rests, therefore, on political 
leader’s attitudes towards evidence; c) widespread consultation with and transparency of 
stakeholder engagement is also vital including the role of the statutory advisory committee 
and the accountability mechanisms. 
 
Reconciling Evidence (From Opaque Policy Goals) 
 
Reconciling different types of evidence is a common theme in debates over the role of 
expertise in policy-making. The notion of professional equipoise is prominent in clinical 
medicine referring to a situation whereby practice is often divided over which treatment is 
the most effective to any given condition (e.g. Elwyn et al, 2000). Likewise, critics have 
pointed out that one of the true stumbling blocks to the realisation of evidence-based policy 
is the fact that the ‘evidence’ is rarely definitive. Indeed, a paradox of research is that the 
more heavily something is researched, the less there is convergence on points of agreement 
(e.g. Head, 2010). 
 
The cannabis debates were no different. The evidence-base for the link between cannabis 
use and mental health is characterised by inconclusive data illustrated in the circumspect 
findings of the ACMD in relation to whether cannabis use causes mental illness (ACMD, 
2002; 2005; 2008). Furthermore, throughout the classification debates, different 
perceptions and interpretations of the evidence competed for influence in the decision-
making process. Evidence cited by David Blunkett in the reclassification (B to C) related to 
the relative toxicity of substances, more specifically the concomitant levels of 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) - the main psychoactive ingredient - found in cannabis. This 
was heavily contested. For supporters of reclassification, evidence was referenced (e.g. 
ECMDDA, 2004) pointing to the fact that the purity and potency of cannabis obtained on 
street had not altered significantly over the previous two decades. For the critics, this was a 
fallacy and claims were made, mainly in the media, suggesting that levels of THC in 
contemporary genetically modified and hydroponic cannabis were anywhere between four 
and 20 times higher than the strains previously used (see Monaghan, 2011). A third 
significant perspective  in this debate is that this is actually ‘non-evidence’, on the grounds 
that data on the effects of drugs on humans is woefully inadequate with significant gaps in 
the evidence-base on ingestion techniques, not to mention the reliability of using seized 
drugs as a gauge for all drugs in circulation. 
 
Whatever the true reading, this example demonstrates that a mechanism for agreeing what 
counts as evidence in such debates was absent. When it comes to decisions over drug 
classification, evidence tends to be canvassed from various channels including the Police 
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and law enforcement agencies, the scientific and expert communities, healthcare 
professionals and those with expertise on youth issues. Indeed, all the above are 
represented on the ACMD. What has been unclear, however, are the grounds on which 
some evidence is given primacy whilst other evidence is relegated to the periphery or 
ignored, leading to questions of transparency in the decision-making process and the 
sophistication of political leader’s understandings of evidence. 
 
Evidence-Imbued Leadership and Political Attitudes to Evidence 
It would be easy to dismiss the political leadership of the New Labour era as having, what 
Weiss (1986) refers to as, a ‘political’ and ‘tactical’ attitude towards the use of evidence in 
policy. This is where evidence is carefully selected to support a pre-aligned policy position 
and where evidence can become subservient to the political realities of the day. Dean 
(2013) makes a compelling case in this regard. Indeed, we have seen how the political winds 
changed under Gordon Brown’s premiership and that Home Secretaries Jacqui Smith and 
Alan Johnson were keen to act on cannabis by reverting it back to class B, in spite of the 
consistent guidance of the ACMD. This was achieved primarily by assigning causation rather 
than correlation to the long-standing issue of cannabis use and its links with mental illness. 
Blackman (2010) suggests that the Brown Government was attempting to reassert its 
commitment to prohibitionist policies, via the construction of a ‘popular preventive.’ Mills 
(2013) shows how in the history of cannabis policy decisions that ostensibly appear to be 
about cannabis are in reality about something else. With this in mind, it could be argued 
that reclassification to class B was less about cannabis per se and more about the new 
leadership establishing its authority. 
 
It would be easy to make these claims, but this is not the only reading of the process, 
especially if a longer ‘policy cycle’ is considered. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993), it takes roughly a decade or more for a policy cycle to undergo a full revolution. If we 
apply this timeframe to the cannabis classification changes focusing on the period from 
2000 to 2010, then we see that evidence was both used and ignored in the decision-making 
process. In the run-up to 2004, David Blunkett was heavily influenced by the evidence 
building up which pointed at the misclassification of cannabis as a class B substance. 
Alongside the toxicological evidence, he was particularly swayed by evidence of potential 
police efficiency savings. Charles Clarke, likewise, allowed himself to be guided by the advice 
of the experts in the area. Dean (2013) stresses that both Blunkett and Clarke had been 
afforded the opportunity to follow the evidence because of uncharacteristic moments of 
liberalism across the UK media spectrum in relation to cannabis. Whether or not this was 
the case, what the episode does indicate is that if a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 1984) 
is opened, politicians and decision-makers can be guided by evidence, but they will have to 
act as an adjudicator between different evidence bases. This will inevitably lead to 
accusations of political expediency when the evidence favoured does not chime with that 
favoured by particular groups, but this is quite different from pronouncing policies to be 
evidence free; an accusation that has been levelled at New Labour’s handling of drug 
classification (MacDonald and Das, 2006). 
 
The Influence of Stakeholders in the Policy-Making Process 
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Under contemporary forms of governance, policy decisions emerge, in part, out of the way a 
range of stakeholders coalesce around a particular position. Various groups arrive at their 
own interpretation of the evidence in order to propel decisions one way or another. 
Previous research has suggested that the evidence produced via expertise that fits in with 
the preconceived ideas of policy makers stands the best chance of being utilised in the 
decision-making process (e.g. Stevens, 2007). To elaborate, this requires consistency 
between experts and decision-makers in relation to a set of pre-existing social and cultural 
values. Ministers, governments and parliamentarians interpret or alight on evidence to align 
with pre-existing belief systems and it is also the case that scientists and experts likewise 
arrive and interpret evidence according to their underlying value systems. The cannabis 
episode, however, demonstrated that whilst evidence selection often follows this trajectory 
it is not a foregone conclusion. Where drug classification is concerned, the ACMD and 
government shared a similar perspective that the current system was broadly fit for 
purpose, but could be improved or ‘rationalised’ by minor tweaks to the legislation, which 
generally involved switching the classification of certain substances. It was only from 2009 
onwards that this system started to visibly malfunctioniii as the government chose to ignore 
the advice of its experts, first concerning cannabis and then ecstasy (Monaghan, 2011). 
A brief review of the debate over ecstasy classification demonstrates how well placed 
evidence producers and the evidence they supply can be side-lined in the decision-making 
process. In this scenario, the ACMD’s (2009) scientific evidence stated that ecstasy is 
harmful, but that its relative harms were not akin to drugs such as heroin and crack cocaine. 
Indeed, they are significantly different if one considers the evidence base on toxicology, 
mortality rates, morbidity rates, and associated social harms (Nutt, et al., 2007; 2010). In the 
ecstasy case, a significant scientific stakeholder lobby advocated policy change. Although 
their arguments were presented in a concerted and largely united front, the scientific 
evidence was side-stepped by the government as a precautionary measure (Monaghan, et 
al, 2012). And on this basis, an opposing coalition advocating maintenance of the status quo 
came to the fore. Indeed, noteworthy support came from the Police and Superintendents 
Association who were quick to point out that classification should not be simply an 
academic or scientific exercise because it involves people’s lives; a point sympathetically 
received by the Brown Government. 
 
Drawing on the work of Habermas, (1975), Blackman (2010) suggests that the fallout over 
the drug classification between the Government and members of the ACMD signified a 
‘legitimation crisis’ in the government’s drug policy; where ‘institutions are out of step with 
social and cultural values and government faces a loss of public confidence’ (Blackman, 
2010:348). This crisis, for Blackman, stemmed from the government’s commitment to the 
war on drugs, despite the fact that some success appeared to be forthcoming with the more 
pragmatic policies being employed such as a reported downturn in cannabis prevalence in 
the population, as evidenced by various sweeps of the then British Crime Survey. In effect, 
Blackman maintains that the government resorted to ‘the personalisation of substantive 
issues’ (ibid.) where to give an appearance of toughness, the work of Nutt and colleagues 
was called into question. 
 
Potential Solutions for Drug Policy Governance 
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Loader and Sparks (2011) comment how in the policy areas of crime and criminal justice 
policy, the relationship between science and politics has heated up over the past few 
decades and is now inherently combustible. Under such conditions, numerous attempts 
have been made to try and add ‘coolant’ to the debate. These include: a) creating a 
heightened role for the use of scientific expertise in policy under the aegis of evidence-
based policy-making; b) creating a heightened awareness for academic work in policy circles 
by academics becoming policy advisors and; c) creating a heightened value for academic 
input into the policy process via academics taking positions within government as an 
observer-turned-player. 
 
The difficulties entailed in the first solution have been covered in previous sections. Points 
‘b’ and ‘c’ are closely aligned and here the role of the academic is broadly on as a knowledge 
broker. There are, however, relatively few accounts of academics working in policy 
departments. One notable exception is Stevens’ (2011) account of his time working for a 
large government department concentrating on social policy and criminal justice issues. He 
found that civil servants were predisposed to using evidence in their decision-making, but 
‘use’ referred to the development of particular policy narratives that they perceived would 
be politically palatable. Thus, evidence selection was contingent on the agents involved and 
how this may or may not aid their career progression. Evidence use was also ideological in 
that because research rarely produces definitive conclusions, the evidence that was selected 
had to fit with stories that did little to challenge the status quo. This was because these 
stories had reached the standard of public value.  
 
Pandering to pre-existing political narratives has been a consistent theme in policy making 
in heavily politicised areas. Loader and Sparks (2011:110-113) demonstrate how much 
contemporary penal policy-making, because it is subject to democratic pressures, has the 
outcome of being ‘excessive and illiberal’. Political deliberations over the length of time a 
terror suspect could be remanded in custody without trial are indicative. Pettit (2001) refers 
to this an ‘outrage dynamic’ whereby political decision-makers need to be totemically tough 
to be appealing to the electorate. Pettit’s solution is to develop ‘arms-length’ institutions or 
bodies that can ‘entrench professional’ expertise in the decision-making process, but can be 
sheltered from the wider political discourse (Loader and Sparks, 2011:112). The example of 
monetary policy and the delegation of setting interest rates to independent central banks is 
frequently cited (Pettit, 2001; Lacey, 2008). The theory here is that certain policies benefit 
from being insulated from politics so that long-term solutions are prioritised over short-
term political gain. 
 
The insulation solution, however, has proven to be imperfect. Devolving the decision to 
experts or even encouraging a space for the rational application of expertise to a policy 
problem could be seen as an abrogation of the principles of democracy and a step along the 
way to technocratic decision-making (Clarence, 2002). Weingert, (1999:154) suggests that 
under the conditions of technocracy, ‘the politician becomes fully dependent on the expert. 
Politics is replaced by a scientifically rationalised administration’ precisely because they 
have the requisite instrumental knowledge at their disposal and are thus in a more 
privileged position than their political counterparts. The promotion of technocratic decision-
making was a la mode in France the nineteenth century and was closely linked to positivism. 
In Britain, as Delanty (1997:26) notes, ‘science was not itself seen as capable of providing 
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political leadership and this legacy remains In contemporary times, technocracy  is rendered 
problematic on the grounds that it neglects the central issue that a certain amount of 
adjudication is always necessary between rival scientific findings. 
 
A potential way forward may lie in giving due recognition to what Sanderson (2009; 2010) 
has termed ‘intelligent government’. Drawing on the ideas of Majone (1989) and Toulmin 
(2001) and writing from the perspective of Dewean pragmatism, Sanderson suggests that 
this requires a movement away from evidence-based policy making underpinned by 
instrumental rational action towards evidence-based policy as practical rational action. 
Underpinning this is the acknowledgement that policy-making in contemporary society must 
deal with complexity and uncertainty and must be as Sanderson (2009:713) notes a ‘broader 
exercise in practical rationality’ whereby communicative and deliberative processes ensure 
that ethical and moral concerns are addressed and all legitimate voices can be heard in 
coming to ‘reasonable decisions’. 
 
The headline event from the cannabis episode – the dismissal of Professor Nutt – suggests, 
however, that on balance in the area of drugs policy and with particular reference to the 
classification of substances, recent government decision-making is driven more by reactions 
to perceived public opinion than being proactively inspired by scientific and other expertise. 
That said, when a longer view is taken covering whole policy cycles, there may be some 
grounds for optimism to realise Sanderson’s goal of viewing policy as practical rationality. It 
is, of course, salient for those extended the franchise to select candidates well versed in 
scientific as well as political decision-making (Henderson, 2012) and this will, therefore not 
be immediate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The epigraph to this analysis on drug policy governance points to one of the most enduring 
dilemmas in political science and elsewhere; that is, how to bridge the gap between what 
Latour (2004) has referred to as the ‘two houses of science and politics’. Such issues have 
taken on added resonance recently with the dismissal of Professor Nutt from his role of 
chair of the ACMD. Looking back at the record of the New Labour government (1997-2010) 
and bearing in mind the difficulties of treating this as a homogenous entity, it would be 
misleading to dismiss outright their efforts in developing drug classification policy with 
recourse to the evidence. This, however, is not to endorse their policy-making as a gold 
standard from which the current and future Government and government’s elsewhere 
should learn. New Labour displayed an acute awareness of the benefits of evidence-imbued 
policy as well as a clear desire to ignore these principles for the sake of gaining political 
capital when it was deemed necessary. History will probably judge that the balance was 
skewed in favour of the latter 
 
Where evidence-based policy making is concerned, the characteristics of good governance 
suggest that good policy development should make use of evidence in a manner that 
creates a mechanism for agreeing what counts as evidence in any given policy area and how 
this should be reconciled. There should be an even-handed approach to evidence by 
decision-makers and key accountability mechanisms. The cannabis episode is particularly 
revealing when analysed through this lens. It demonstrates how there is still much to do if 
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these aspirations are to be realised in practice. UK drug policy making is fraught with 
political challenges where politicians make policy in an almost permanent state of 
electioneering, but evidence can and does play a role and so, whilst this is probably not a 
case study in effective governance, nor is it one of total disregard for the principles of good 
governance outlined by the UKDPC.  
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Notes 
 
 
                                            
i In the 2005 Drugs Act, against the evidence and the opinion of various practitioners, magic 
mushrooms were placed into class A on the grounds that their active components - psilocin 
and psilocybin - were of equivalent harm as other class A substances. This has had 
consequences for use of psilocybins, in particular, in treatment for mental health conditions. 
ii The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act was also altered so that cannabis assumed a 
unique status as a class C drug as the police maintained the power of arrest for those caught 
in possession (Warburton, et al, 2005, p. 116). Additionally, the 2003 Criminal Justice Act 
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introduced more draconian punishments for supply of class C substances from five years to 
fourteen years, on a par with those of class B 
iii In reality, the dissonance probably started much earlier from around 2003/4 when advice 
on Ecstasy was rejected as were many of the findings from influential reports such as the 
Police Foundation 
Inquiry (2000). 
 
